Putin’s Repression Doesn't Need to be Massive to Be Intimidating Because It is Unpredictable, Astashin Says

Paul Goble

Staunton, May 14 – Repression in the Russian Federation as measured by the number of cases brought on political charges has remained relatively constant over the last several years, an indication that the Putin regime, Ivan Astashin says; but it has remained effective as an intimidating factor precisely because of its unpredictability.

It often seems that repression is increasing, but in fact, the number of cases has remained at approximately 500 each quarter for several years, a level that Memorial’s Repression Barometer suggests means that “the Russian authorities view the current level as optimal” (memopzk.org/analytics/barometr-repressij-i-kvartal-2026-goda).

Commenting on this finding, Astashin, a former political prisoner and human rights campaigner, argues that the relatively low number of repressive acts by the Putin regime nonetheless performs the same function as the mass-scale repressions under Stalin (ru.themoscowtimes.com/2026/05/14/nepredskazuemost-vmesto-massovosti-kak-rabotayut-repressii-v-sovremennoi-rossii-a195320).

This is so, the activist continues, because “although repression in Russia now does not touch everyone directly, it renders ‘anyone’ a potential target of repression and thus serves as a weapon for intimidating the population not through sheer scale but through complete unpredictability.”

Given that many people are saying and writing the same things but only a few are singled out for persecution, he says, “no one can predict not only what is permissible but when the state will decide to mete out punishment.” As a result, “each case sends a signal that formally rules exist but in practice they are applied selectively, and no one can be sure he won’t be next.”

According to Astashin, “the state cannot imprison millions of people now – but it doesn’t need to: It is enough to imprison hundreds of them in an unpredictable and haphazard manner to foster a pervasive sense that anyone could end up behind bars,” something the wording of laws makes possible and encourages Russians to conclude “it is safer to do nothing at all.”

** Activists are the first targets of this spreading fear, but “increasingly, the victims of unpredictable repressions are ordinary people who are insufficiently informed about the nature of the crackdown,” and thus speak or write in ways others are getting away with but they are not.**

** Astashin adds that “t**he media—both pro-government and independent outlets—play a significant role in shaping the perception of these repressions as "total" in scope, even though the majority of those 500 cases per quarter receive little to no coverage. Those that do are trumpeted and thus have the same effect as the relatively small number of direct victims.

In sum, he says, “Russian repressions thus need not necessarily be mass-scale in nature. Their efficacy rests upon a combination of unpredictability and demonstrativeness: while the majority of cases remain all but invisible, select stories are transformed into a signal intended for everyone else.”

And that means that “if human rights defenders are correct—and if the authorities truly view the current level of repression as "optimal"—it may well be precisely because nothing more is required. One need not imprison millions to instill fear in millions. It is sufficient to maintain a steady stream of cases and demonstrate to the public that anyone could be next.”