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  "path": "/t/the-behavior-of-the-company-adguard/36564?page=2#post_28",
  "publishedAt": "2026-04-13T02:04:08.000Z",
  "site": "https://discuss.privacyguides.net",
  "textContent": "seize:\n\n> US\n\nI’ll combine your two messages and respond to them together: I’m basing my assessment on what they’re capable of doing. Handing over the keys to an entire house for free isn’t the same as infiltrating the house completely.\n\nWhat Proton did was hand over a portion of its infrastructure within the United States, and if certain actors (regardless of who they are) intend to do so, they can gain an even deeper understanding of how the internal system works if they know what they’re doing. From there, they can learn to develop better tools than Claude for such purposes, and of course, real-time access could become a reality in the future. There are many things I don’t know; I have no idea if they’re doing it or not—there’s too much classified information there.\n\nThe strategies that exist in that country are numerous, and I’m familiar with a percentage of the patterns—that’s why I said that about Proton, which led me to abandon it.\n\nTechnically speaking, the Meet system is vulnerable there; it’s essentially giving away how Proton works for free.\n\nIt’s not fear, but the patterns and emerging situations reveal that things are looking bad.\n\nKey → If you know your enemy well, you know how they act.\n\nIt’s not a conspiracy; it’s reality.",
  "title": "The behavior of the company AdGuard"
}