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  "path": "/t/the-behavior-of-the-company-adguard/36564?page=2#post_27",
  "publishedAt": "2026-04-12T23:24:25.000Z",
  "site": "https://discuss.privacyguides.net",
  "tags": [
    "[1]",
    "[2]",
    "↩︎"
  ],
  "textContent": "DanielM:\n\n> they could develop better tools to exploit more vulnerabilities and decrypt traffic in real time, with or without prior notice to the public. If they were to do so with notification, they would use the pretext of protecting the country and monitoring the traffic flowing through their networks (fiber-optic cables) without authorization from a judge or the Supreme Court\n\nThe only _real_ difference between this hypothetical and now[1] is the “in real time”. I am not a cryptographer so I cannot say how reasonable, or unreasonable it would be to break Proton’s encryption “in real time”, but what I will say is that infrastructure does not need to be physically located in an area for data sent from that originating infrastructure to be compromised in transit.\n\nSo even if Proton had all of their infrastructure physically in Switzerland **they do not** the NSA (or insert government agency/bad actor/company with Mythos Preview) could still _theoretically_ break the encryption of data sent between a Proton User and Proton servers while it is in transit.\n\nDanielM:\n\n> Proton AG is vulnerable by installing its Meet infrastructure in the United States instead of Switzerland or another country they use, such as the Secure Core servers,\n\nIt sounds to me more like your concern is more focused around Proton having _physical_ infrastructure in the US, which the US government _could_ **physically** wiretap or backdoor without any prior notice to users[2], instead of being concerned about the effects Mythos Preview will have on the security of Proton products outside of a fear that the US government will use Mythos Preview as a building off point for future undisclosed automated vulnerability exploitation programs.\n\n* * *\n\n  1. Yes, I’m aware FISA courts exist, but they don’t really do much to inform the public or the individual(s) being surveilled ↩︎\n\n  2. This is quite reasonable considering you have stated “I don’t live in that country”, but it does somewhat feel like a separate issue from the undeniable cybersecurity impact Claude’s Mythos Preview will have on global digital infrastructure. ↩︎\n\n\n",
  "title": "The behavior of the company AdGuard"
}