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  "canonicalUrl": "https://jcrt.org/archives/02.3/cha/",
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  "publishedAt": "2001-01-01T00:00:00.000Z",
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  "textContent": "Cha - Language, Conceptualization and Awakening - JCRT 2.3 \n\nLanguage, Conceptualization and Awakening: On the Paradox of Discourse in Classical Indian _Yogacara_\n\nJohn Y. Cha  \nGustavus Adolphus College\n\n  \n\n1\\. Proem\n\nThe following essay attempts to do two things: it seeks to analyze Indian Buddhist (_Yogacara_) understandings of the relation between language (doctrine) and reality (Suchness), and relate this analysis to contemporary issues. This is a tall order, one perhaps a bit too tall for a single paper. Hence, the second part is unavoidably (too) brief: the only issue broached is the difficulty and importance of comparative analysis between the proverbial \"East\" and \"West\". One the other hand, the first attempt is carried out through an analysis of _Yogacara_ philosophy and its embeddedness in classical Indian intellectual culture (approximately 500 BCE to 500 CE). However, one consequence of the heightened state of specialization (endemic not only to academia but also to most \"technologized\" cultures) is that discourse is becoming increasingly narrowed; therefore, my analysis is unavoidably focused on one school of Buddhist thought whose texts were composed between the fourth and sixth centuries of the Common Era. Therefore, a large portion of this essay is of necessity technical, in some cases more suited for those who specialize in Buddhist Studies. But all is not lost, despite the extremes of generality and specialization herein. For we find in the intellectual culture of classical India an extreme form of privileging theory over practice, a conscious effort throughout the period to construct what we would call nowadays a metanarrative. And, on the basis of a close reading of their texts I conclude that _Yogacara_ thinkers 'occasioned' modes of thought that would have seemed to subvert, if only potentially or ideally, the strict hierarchy of theory over practice. Now, it is _not_ my contention that _Yogacara_ thinkers consciously engaged in a type of deconstruction. However, if some layers of 'subversive occasioning' lie in texts whose times, places and situations are far removed from our own, then that is in itself good enough reason to begin digging.\n\n2\\. Introduction\n\n3\\. The Shastric Context of Buddhist Discourse\n\n> Cultural knowledge is transcendent in origin, and its authority is therefore unimpeachable. Since this knowledge is always already revealed to human beings via _sastra_ their mastery of the practices inscribed therein is a function of conformity to the preexistent paradigm. Thus the process of amelioration conceived of as \"progress\" in the post- Enlightenment West is here instead \"regression\" to the normative divine model; what is there viewed as \"discovery\" is here in essence nothing but recovery.\n\n4.0. _Yogacara_: Text/Ontology\n\n4.1. Reversals: Immanence/Transcendence\n\n4.2. Being/Non-Being\n\n> Non-being \\[means\\] that this verbal designation of \"form\" up to the verbal designation of \"nirvana\" is without an objective basis, that is, it is without characterization, that the basis of verbal designation is completely non-existent, that is, completely absent. Verbal designation functions without relying on any existing thing. This is called non-being.\n\n> And also, whosoever negates the locus for the characteristic of verbal designation, which is the basis for the characteristic of verbal designation, completely negates the object that is the ineffable, ultimately real existence. \\[Thus the nihilist states\\]: \"everything is completely non-existent.\"\n\n> Anything posited as the self-nature (_svabhava_) of verbal designation (_prajnaptivada_)' \\[Indeed\\], the self-nature of the factors of existence (_dharma_) is the \"referent\" of verbal designation, and it is called \"being\" by the worldly.\n\n> And whosoever attaches to the own-nature of the verbal designation for factors of existence, i.e., the specific characteristic of form, etc., \\[does so\\] because of the postulation of existence upon that which does not exist.\n\n> Unreal mental construction exists; in that \\[unreal mental construction\\] duality does not exist (1ab).\n\n> But here \\[in unreal mental construction\\] emptiness exists; that \\[unreal mental construction\\] too exists in that \\[emptiness\\] (1cd).\n\n> Some maintain that all factors of existence are completely without self-nature, just like the horns of a rabbit. For that reason, in order to counter the negation of all things (_sarvapavada_) \\[Maitreya\\] said,  \n>      Unreal mental construction exists (1a);  \n> \"in-itself\" (_svabhavatas_) should be added. \\[The opponent objects:\\] Is it not the case that this assertion contradicts scripture, because it is said in scripture that \"all factors of existence are empty\"? \\[We respond:\\] There is no contradiction because \\[it is further stated that\\]  \n>      in that \\[unreal mental construction\\] duality does not exist. (1b)  \n> Indeed, unreal mental construction which is devoid of the \\[duality\\] of any entity of subject and object of cognition, is called \"empty\" but not completely without self-nature.\n\n> Or, in order to counter the view, \"visual form, etc., exist as real entities apart from mind and mental functions\", \\[Maitreya\\] stated  \n>      Unreal mental construction exists (1a);  \n> \"as a real entity\" \\[should be added\\]. Visual form does not exist separated from that \\[consciousness\\]. Why? Since,  \n>      in that \\[unreal mental construction\\] duality does not exist (1b)  \n> Indeed, unreal mental construction is neither the perceiver of something nor is it perceived by anything. However, \\[unreal mental construction\\] as the absence of the subject and object of perception is the sole reality (_bhavamatra_).\n\n4.3. The Presence of Absence\n\n> But here \\[in unreal mental construction\\] emptiness exists; that \\[unreal mental construction\\] too exists in that \\[emptiness\\].\n\n4.4. Primacy of the Text and Ontological Dependency\n\n> \\[A designation\\] is neither the essential nature of that _dharma_, nor is it wholly other than that. That \\[essential nature\\] is neither the sphere of speech nor the object of speech; nor is it altogether different from these. That being the case, the essential nature of _dharmas_ is not found in the way in which it is expressed. But further, neither is absolutely nothing found. Again, the essential nature is absent and yet not absolutely absent.\n\n> And also, whosoever negates the locus for the characteristic of verbal designation, which is the basis for the characteristic of verbal designation, completely negates the object that is the ineffable, ultimately real existence.\n\n5\\. Conclusion\n\n  \n\nNotes\n\n_abhutaparikalpo sti_\n_\\[iti\\] svabhavata iti vakyasesah / nanv evam. su4travirodhah sarvadharmah sunya iti sutre vacanat / nasti virodhah yasmad_\n_dvayam. tatra na vidyate_ _/_\n_abhutaparikalpo sti_\n_\\[iti sa evasti\\] dravyatah / nasti rupam. tadvyatiriktam. \\[nasti\\] dravyata iti / kim. karanam yasmad_\n_dvayam tatra na vidyate_\n  \n\n> John Y. Cha (Ph D Northwestern University), is an Assistant Professor of Religion at Gustavus Adolphus College in Minnesota. He specializes in classical Indian Buddhist philosophy focusing on the Yogacara and Madhyamika schools. His other interests include modern Japanese philosophy (Kyoto School), comparative philosophy and phenomenology.\n\n  \n\n> \n\n  *\n\n ' 2001 John Y. Cha. All rights reserved.  \nUpdated 07/28/21.   \nhttp://jcrt.org/archives/02.3/cha/\n\n---",
  "title": "Language, Conceptualization and Awakening: on the Paradox of Discourse in Classical Indian Yogacara"
}