The Myth of Vietnam’s Tilt Toward China

Analyzing Hanoi’s foreign policy from the perspective of its relationship with a single major power misses the forest for the trees. Vietnamese President and Communist Party chief To Lam’s recent visit to China marked his first overseas trip since the 14th National Party Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) and the consolidation of Vietnam’s top two positions in the hands of a single individual. The visit bears political significance as it confirms that despite the domestic political restructuring, Vietnam is continuing its non-aligned foreign policy and wants to maintain an amicable bilateral relationship in the face of the rogue use of force by the United States elsewhere. Analysts have been quick to argue that Lam’s visit signaled a change in Vietnam’s balanced foreign policy between Washington and Beijing, as Vietnam signed major infrastructure, technology, and supply chains agreements with China. Hanoi also affirmed its support for China’s Global Development Initiative, Global Security Initiative, Global Civilization Initiative, and Global Governance Initiative, as well as the “Community of Common Destiny” that it joined in 2023. The newly inaugurated China-Vietnam “3+3” strategic dialogue between their respective ministries of foreign affairs, defense, and public security seems to drive home the point that Vietnam is moving closer to China. However, this conclusion is premature. These analysts have committed a reductionist error in understanding Vietnam’s foreign policy. Vietnam’s relationship with China is rarely only about the two countries, because Hanoi’s dense web of partnerships requires constant calibration and adjustment to ensure that its relations with other great powers are not hampered. In short, Vietnam will balance its moves with one power against another to neutralize their political significance and maintain Hanoi’s overall neutrality. To fully comprehend Vietnam’s foreign policy, we should not focus on Vietnam’s bilateral relations with a specific country but on how Vietnam, as a hub, calibrates among its spokes. Analyzing Vietnam’s foreign policy from the perspective of a single spoke misses the forest for the trees. There are many examples of such contradictory interpretations of Hanoi’s improvement of relations with a great power, which situate those improvements in a bilateral rather than a wider, multilateral context. For instance, when Vietnam leapfrogged its relationship with the United States to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP) in September 2023, some analysts concluded that Hanoi was “tilting toward” the United States. Just three months later, Vietnam joined China’s “Community of Common Destiny” during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Hanoi. This time, some watchers considered the move as Hanoi’s endorsement of Beijing’s vision in the great-power competition. Both takes were reductive. When taking into account Hanoi’s moves with the United States and China, Vietnam apparently wanted to neutralize the political significance of the upgrade with Washington by participating in China’s initiative. Hanoi’s intent to manage its various “spokes” is evident, as it swiftly upgraded ties with Japan, Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, and the United Kingdom to the CSP level after September 2023. Before 2023, Hanoi had only four CSPs–with China, Russia, India, and South Korea. Another example is Lam’s visit to the United States to attend President Donald Trump’s Board of Peace meeting in February, shortly after his confirmation as CPV general secretary for the 2026-2031 term. The timing of the visit, his first overseas trip after the Party Congress in January, once again raised the question of Vietnam’s alignment, since aside from Laos and Cambodia, Vietnam’s top leaders typically picked China as the destination of their first trip to a major power after being appointed. However, the political significance of Lam’s U.S. visit was easily countered by his August 2024 visit to China, after succeeding former General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong, who died in office in July. And by visiting China last month, shortly after acquiring the top two posts of Vietnam’s political system, Lam elevated the symbolic significance of the tradition. Another indicator of Vietnam’s calibration of its “spokes” can be seen in its public statements with its partners. Vietnam always emphasizes that its improvements in relations with one country don’t constitute hostile intent against another. For example, on upgrading U.S.-Vietnam ties in 2023, Trong stressed, “Viet Nam wishes to boost relations with the U.S. and other international partners in line with the spirit outlined by President Ho Chi Minh after Viet Nam regained its independence: That is, Viet Nam wishes to make friends with all countries.” Later that year, Trong downplayed the notion that Vietnam was taking China’s side with Xi by affirming Vietnam’s foreign policy of “independence, self-reliance, multilateralization, and diversification of external ties.” Lam has upheld the same principle. When he visited the United States in September 2024, Lam agreed that “Vietnam and the United States had the same vision on building a better shared future for all of humanity.” At the Board of Peace meeting, Vietnam internationalized the political significance of Lam’s participation by affirming its call for peaceful settlements of all disputes in line with the United Nations Charter and international laws. It did not want to be perceived as endorsing just U.S. President Donald Trump’s vision. The most recent Lam-Xi joint statement once again affirmed Vietnam’s non-aligned foreign policy. The same emphasis on Vietnam’s nonalignment embedded in multilateralism is evident in its statements with its post-2023 CSP partners, Japan, Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, and the United Kingdom. This reflects Hanoi’s conscious effort to bind its partners to its “Four Nos” foreign policy principles (no military alliances, no siding with one country against another, no foreign military bases, and no use of Vietnamese territory to oppose other countries, no use of force or threats to use force in international relations). By sticking to multilateralism, Hanoi is siding with no one. Doubling down on its non-alignment is Vietnam’s best hedge against the United States’ recent rogue use of force because it allows Hanoi to manage relations with the United States as a U.S. partner and not a U.S. enemy. Besides assuring China that Vietnam isn’t siding with the United States against it, Vietnam also must convince the United States that it doesn’t intend to join a Beijing-led coalition against Washington. Tilting toward China at a moment that Washington wants its allies and partners to decouple from China risks inserting Vietnam into the great-power competition. First, Washington could impose more tariffs on Vietnamese exports, which were valued at $178 billion in 2025 and are still growing, despite U.S. protectionist policies. Second, Washington could restrict Vietnam’s access to advanced sensitive technologies. Third, the United States could rescind its respect for the CPV’s political authority. Fourth, tilting toward China would undermine Vietnam’s ongoing island reclamation campaign in the South China Sea. The reason why Hanoi can build new islands without condemnation from both China and the United States is its neutrality. If the United States is convinced that Vietnam has sided with China, it may challenge the latter’s activities in the same way it has done to China. Finally, tilting toward China will undermine Hanoi’s foreign relations with its other partners that are U.S. allies, with whom Hanoi also has major infrastructure, technology, and supply chain agreements. It is tempting to conclude that Vietnam is tilting toward China to hedge against the U.S. abandonment of its global leadership, but upon closer examination, it is more like Vietnam is encouraging China to respect its “Four Nos” and China is willing to do so in order to keep Vietnam neutral. Vietnam has leveraged the fact that it shares a communist political system as a means to bind China into its Four Nos vision, so recent developments such as the “3+3” dialogue should be perceived as an expansion of that strategy, not as a sign of greater Vietnamese alignment with China. From a hub-and-spokes perspective, Vietnam’s improving relations with one partner is conducive to its strengthening ties with another. A reductionist take will misconstrue Vietnam’s management of its network as moves in a zero-sum game. By Khang Vu – The Diplomat – May 4, 2026

Related posts:

1. Vietnam may soon sue China on South China Sea Hanoi is weighing an international arbitration case against Beijing to...
2. Vietnam begins Covid-19 vaccination drive without China-made shots Vietnam, the only Asean nation that has yet to publicly...
3. Vietnam, ASEAN, and the US-China Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific An interview with Le Hong Hiep. How do Vietnam and...